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The paper deals with the problem of the so-called “war against terrorism” in the 
context of the traditional concept of “just war” (bellum iustum), a concept believed 
to belong to the history of international law. Thus, the paper analyses, through the 
works of various authors, how the theoretical concept of just war evolved over the 
centuries. On the other hand, nowadays, i.e. after the September 11 attacks on New 
York and Washington, the use of the word “war” seems to be omnipresent in politi-
cal declarations, in world media, and even in the writings of some legal commenta-
tors, when referring to the unilateral use of force by some States, targeted not only 
at terrorist organizations (e.g. Al-Qaida) and their members, but also at States “ac-
cused” to support terrorism. However, in contemporary international law there is 
no legal basis for the unilateral use of force, except in self-defense.  For that reason, 
the just war doctrine is sometimes used as a meta-juridical basis for such action.   
Keywords: “war against terrorism”, “just war” (bellum iustum), terrorism, terror-
ist organizations, United Nations, use of force          
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2003 on the eve of the American attack on Iraq, American Presi-
dent George W. Bush declared in his state of address: “[T]he US is completely 
certain Saddam has a nuclear weapon and God forbids he uses one.”1 Shortly 
afterwards, Saddam Hussein was deposed after military intervention of the US 
and its allies, Iraq was subjugated and occupied, just like Afghanistan had been 
earlier. Admittedly, the international community’s fear of the so-called “nuclear 
terrorism” was instituted in subsequently adopted International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005. Needless to say, the nu-
clear weapon the American President referred to was never found in Iraq, and 
nowadays no end seems to be in sight for the so-called “war against terrorism” 
embodied in the American fight against Al-Qaeda predominantly, but also against 
the States the American President indicates as the “axis of evil”.2
1 See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html; (21 June 2003). 
President Bush uttered almost the same words before, in September 2002, in his speech to the 
UN General Assembly. See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-2.
html; (20 November 2006).
2 President Bush speaks about the so-called “axis of evil”, which, completely arbitrarily deter-
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The military occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies, seen 
through the prism of millennial history of international law, would certainly not 
account for any novelty, but the activity of this sort may not find its legal founda-
tion easily in the current international community, whose foundations are laid on 
the cogent prohibition of unilateral threat or the use of force against any state, its 
territorial integrity or political independence inconsistent with the UN Charter, as 
it is provided by peremptory international legal norms.3 This being so, if the legal 
foundation of such acting would exist at all, then it would undisputedly lie at the 
level of secondary international legal norm which should even per se unlawful 
response to terrorism – outlawed by primary norms of international law – “bring 
back” to the sphere of legally admissible. However, does such a secondary inter-
national legal norm exist in reality? For centuries international law scholars have 
been searching for such a norm upon which to establish “the right to wage war” 
(ius ad bellum). Thus it was long before the prohibition against aggressive war 
became a constituent of positive international law.4 It may well be so because to 
attack another, almost like the “general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations”, has long been conceived as malum in se. However, malum is not merely 
a legal category at this point. Primarily, the evil exists as an antipode to the good, 
and the latter, it is believed, becomes complete in the “absolute”, which, in turn, 
by definition, is undisputable “fullness of good”. Therefore, throughout history 
it was perhaps always easier for “the stronger” to prove its actions “correct” by 
way of reference to the eschatological absolute observed through its own eyes, 
rather than to legal norms which, owing to their more specific content, subject 
the “argument” of force to impersonal regulation of social relations. American 
President’s calling upon “divine authority” in his speech, just like Ancient Roman 
fetiales once used to do in their prayers,5 in general represents a certainly much 
mined, also includes over 60 countries that ”support terrorism”. Comp. e.g. Pellet, A., Tzank-
ov, V., “Can a State Victim of a Terror Act Have Recourse to Armed Force?”, Humanitäres 
Völkerrecht, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, p. 71.
3 Probably the most important provision of the UN Charter, contained in Article 2, paragraph 
4, sets out: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
4 The beginnings of unconditional prohibition against aggressive war in international law are as-
sociated with the Paris Pact (the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928. Article 1 of the Paris 
Pact provides: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective 
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.“ For the 
wording of the Pact see in: La Pradelle, A. de, La paix moderne, Paris, Les éditions internation-
ales, MCMXLVII, pp. 330-331.
5 The declaration of war in Ancient Rome fell within the competence of priests – fetiales. They 
would, as recounted by Titus Livius (Livy), call upon their Gods as witnesses of „injustice“ 
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simpler justification for the use of force than the one that should be sought at the 
level of secondary norms of the international legal system. Hence, the concept of 
“just war” (bellum iustum), as an institute established by secondary international 
legal norms, and focused on justification for the use of force against another state, 
also entered into the system of international law by means of theology. Neverthe-
less, just like international law struggled to include equity (as a genuine meta-
juridic category) in the content of its norms throughout its development, efforts 
were likewise made to provide a positive legal framework for the concept of “just 
war”, on which, after all, the entire regulation of the use of force in contemporary 
international legal order rests upon. However, the so called “war against terror-
ism” – an expression constructed particularly after the terrorist attacks on New 
York and Washington on September 11, 2001, was only seemingly a novelty, 
but essentially it often leaves an impression of merely a new manifestation of 
requirements of the “stronger” for the unilateral use of force in contrast with the 
positive international legal system that was primarily established by their own 
efforts. This paper, therefore, if anything seeks to touch upon the relationship 
between the force and law in the mentioned context, naturally, having in mind 
that it is always more than mere antagonism. Indeed, only the secondary norm 
turns force from sheer violence into a social response to a wrongful act. After all, 
Aristotle would also say: “Nobody chooses to make war or provokes it for the 
sake of making war…”6
II THE CONCEPT OF “JUST WAR” (BELLUM IUSTUM) IN THE  
DOCTRINE (OF INTERNATIONAL LAW)
The use of force in international relations is undisputedly as old as the concept 
of international community. However, the regulation of the use of force lies at the 
core of any organized community, including the international one, for functional 
imperative of common life requires overcoming the “natural state” of anarchy 
inflicted upon them by another country, justifying the attack by words: „Audi Iuppiter, et tu 
Iuno, Quirine diique omnes caelestes vosque terrestres vosque inferni audite! Ego vos testor 
populum illum (...) iniustum esse neque ius persolvere ...“ Nonetheless, even at this point a dis-
tinction needs to be made: fetiales would call upon such an eschatological authority more like a 
“judge” than like an immediate “executor” of one’s own “justice”. Although in this respect the 
victory in war also implied a certain “verdict”, the serious wording at the end of the fetiales’ 
prayer somehow bears witness to a priori impartiality of the divine “tribunal”: “Si ego iniuste 
impieque illos homines illasque res dedier mihi exposco, tum patriae compotem me numquam 
siris esse.” Titus Livius Ab Verbe Condita, Vol. 1, Lipsiae, Hertz, Tauchnitz, MDCCCLVII, 
Book 1, para. 32:6-14, pp. 36-37. See also: Bederman, D.J., International Law in Antiquity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 232.
6 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, London, Penguin, 1976, 1177b, p. 329. 
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– bellum omnium contra omnes.7 Therefore, with the establishment of the first, 
at the time only isolated ancient international communities (e.g. in the territory 
of Mesopotamia, Ancient India, Ancient Greece or Ancient China for that mat-
ter) the use of force must have risen from the level of mere “subjective law” (or 
better to say, factual possibility) to the level of secondary norm of the normative 
system that regulates the relations in such a community. The use of force thus 
becomes determined by assumptions that render it admissible for the respective 
system, and in turn separate from mere violence. Consequently, the force needs 
to establish its justification and foothold in the secondary norm, adopting the 
role of response to the infringement of the primary norm of a given normative – 
legal, but equally moral or religious system, at any rate.8 Hence, the category of 
“just”, needles to say with potential relativity of its content, easily becomes “an 
intersection” of secondary norms of all normative systems that regulate relations 
between entities of a given community, including admissibility of the internal use 
of force.9 It is a small wonder, then, that the concept of “just war” (Lat. bellum 
iustum; Gr. Polemos dikaios; Sanskr. dharma yuddha) may be found in almost all 
latitudes and throughout almost all historical periods, incorporated in religious, 
moral, or legal, for that matter – and hence international legal secondary norms.
Thus, in Ancient Greece e.g. efforts were made to constrain the right of the 
use of force, sometimes also through compulsory means of pacific settlement 
of disputes between city-states, polises.10 Some polis leagues, such as e.g. the 
7 For Hobbes and Spinoza the non-regulated (or better to say, pre-regulated) status of social rela-
tions is manifested in the so-called “natural state” (status naturae) of anarchy, incorporated in 
the principle bellum omnium contra omnes. See: Hobbes, Th., Leviathan, Cambridge, New York, 
Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney, Cambridge University Press, 1991, Chapter XIII, pp. 86-90; 
Spinoza, B., Tractatus theologico-politicus, in: Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt om-
nia, Vol. III, Lipsiae, Ex officina Bernhardi Tauchnitz, 1846, Chapter XVI, pp. 206-220.
8 Namely, the legal theory in general makes a distinction between two levels in legal (and nor-
mative, in principle) systems: the levels of primary and secondary norms. Primary norms di-
rectly or indirectly impose a specific obligation on States, its addressees, whereas Secondary 
norms provide for legal consequences of a failure to fulfil the obligations established by Pri-
mary norms. See: Zemanek, K., “The Legal Foundations of the International System, General 
Course on Public International Law”, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 
de La Haye, Vol. 266, 1997, p. 233; Zemanek, K., “The Unilateral Enforcement of Internation-
al Obligations”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 47, No. 
1, 1987, pp.32-33. See also: Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the work 
of its 25th session, 7 May – 13 July 1973, A/9010/Rev.1, para.40; and A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/
Add.1, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, 1973, pp.167-170.
9 For more details on interpenetration of secondary norms in the international community, see: 
Lapaš, D., “Uloga metajuridičkih sankcija u zaštiti međunarodnopravnih norm”, Pravni vjes-
nik, Vol. 21, No. 1-2, 2005, pp. 197-211.
10 See: Calogeropoulos-Stratis, S., Ius ad bellum – Le droit de recourir à la guerre, Athènes, 
L’Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales de l’Université de Paris, 1950, p. 17.
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Corinth League, prohibited the war between its polis members before their dis-
pute had been submitted to arbitration whose decisions were binding.11 
In Ancient Israel, the Jews made a distinction between two types of wars: 
those waged as Lords’ “tools” and those waged “on one’s own accord”. In the for-
mer, the “justification” was taken for granted – “covered” by divine authority,12 
but the idea of justice often served as “justification” for the latter type of wars as 
well.13 For instance, the wars against “idolatrous peoples” were considered ad-
missible by Jews, even in terms of, nowadays called, “preventive strike”.14
In Ancient Rome the regulations for the right to wage war (ius ad bellum) 
were constituents of the “sacred right” (ius sacrum), and thus in the hands of the 
priests- fetiales. Four reasons were considered to be reasons of the “just war”: in-
fringement of a Roman state, offence of a representative, breach of a contract, and 
support to Roman enemies.15 Subsequently, Cicero puts forward three conditions 
for a “just war”: a just cause, formal announcement by the sovereign, and proper 
war waging16 (in turn, ius ad bellum also becomes stipulated by compliance with 
ius in bello to a certain extent). 
In trace of Cicero, St. Augustine introduces a “just cause” (iusta causa) to 
just requirements, i.e. the admissibility of war, but also a just intention (iusta 
intentio) – the requirements that were to become a foundation of the doctrine of 
just war in centuries to come. Moreover, he also stipulates admissibility of war by 
authorization (and in turn, legal announcement of war), then by the proportional-
ity between the used force and the previously mentioned “just intention”, and by 
its significance as ultima ratio instrument in the fulfilment of the intention.17 
11 Ibid., p. 18. Hence, the Greek thought considers the just war to be the result of: revenge, self-
defence, and aid to allies. For more see: Taghi Karoubi, M., Just or Unjust War? International 
Law and Unilateral Use of Armed Force by States at the Turn of the 20th Century, Hants, 
Burlington, Ashgate, 2004, p. 59.
12 Calogeropoulos-Stratis, op. cit., (ft. 10), p. 20. The Biblical description of destruction of Ajath 
by Israel may also be used to illustrate the above-mentioned; see: The Biblical description of 
destruction of A-’I by Israel may also be used to illustrate the above-mentioned; see: The Holly 
Bible, Joshua 8:18-29, London, New York, Collins’ Clear-Type Press, p. 153. 
13 See: Calogeropoulos-Stratis, op. cit., (ft. 10), pp. 20-21.
14 See: Wilkes, G., „Judaism and Justice in War“, in: Robinson, P. (ed.), Just War in Contempo-
rary Perspective, Hampshire, Burlington, Ashgate, 2003, p. 17.
15 See: Taghi Karoubi, op. cit. (ft. 11), p. 60. For more, see also: Bederman, op. cit. (ft. 5), pp. 
208-242.
16 Cicero makes a distinction between four types of war: “[I]ustum, iniustum, civile et plus quam 
civile. Iustum bellum est quod ex praedicto geritur de rebus repetitis aut propulsandorum hos-
tium cusa. Iniustum bellum est quod de furore, non de legitima ratione initur…” See: Cicero, 
M. T., Libri politici – De re publica, Vol. 1, Zagreb, Demetra, 1995, Book II, p. 100; Book III, 
p. 162. For more details on non-punitive purpose of the war by Polybius, see: Przetacznik, F., 
“The Illegality of the Concept of Just War under Contemporary International Law”, Revue de 
droit international, Vol. LXX, 1992, p. 252.
17 For more, see: Calogeropoulos-Stratis, op. cit., (ft. 10), p. 26; Przetacznik, op. cit. (ft. 16), p.252.
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Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas also refers the concept of “just war” to the 
requirement of authorization of the sovereign to wage war, and to the “just cause” 
and “just intention”. Moreover, he insists that the war be waged as a response 
to the inflicted unlawfulness exclusively, and its scope to be commeasurable to 
unlawfulness.18
Francisco Suarez also puts forward almost the same requirements for “just 
war”, in an effort, just like his predecessors, to incorporate “just war” into the idea 
of Christianity. He thus draws the war closer to the concept of sanction, pointing 
out that the one who wages a “just war” does not act in contradiction with Chris-
tian teaching for he does not hate the enemy, but merely sanctions his actions.19 
In that respect, Suarez follows the teaching of his great predecessor, de Vitoria, 
who clearly excludes religious wars, wars of conquest, wars “for personal glory 
of the sovereign”, and wars waged for “negligible injustice” from the concept of 
“just war” – i.e. wars that are disproportionate to the inflicted unlawfulness.20
Albericus Gentilis, a great scholar of international law at the turn of the 17th 
century bequeaths to us one of the most invaluable deeds in history of the doc-
trine of international law – De iure belli (1588). In his teaching, Gentilis clearly 
singles out self-defence as a “just war”, putting it a par with an inherent right. 
Moreover, in so doing he distinguishes between “necessary defence” (necessaria 
defensio), collective – “honest defence” (honestia defensio) and also anticipatory 
self-defence (utilis defensio), to a certain extent.21
Hugo Grotius in his work De iure belli ac pacis (1625), in line with Gentilis, 
lays foundations for contemporary doctrine of international law, providing the 
first, so to speak, systematic outline of international law in a contemporary sense 
of the word. Nonetheless, it seems he does not go any further than his great prede-
cessors in terms of justification of the use of force. Grotius deems “just war” to be 
primarily a defence war, a war to rectify the unlawfulness (for instance, the return 
of ownership), but also a punitive war, considering it in the sense of international 
legal sanction.22
In that respect, in his great work “Esprit des Lois” Montesquieu considers the 
concept of “just war” as an instrument of justice.23
18 For more, see: Aquinas, Th., Summa theologica, Vol. 18, II-II, quaestio LXIV, art. VII, Heidel-
berg, München, Graz, Wien, Salzburg, F. H. Kerle, A. Pustet, 1953, p. 175.
19 For a more detailed overview of Suarez’s teaching, see: Truyol y Serra, A., Histoire du droit inter-
national public, Paris, Economica, 1995, pp. 53-55. See also: Przetacznik, op. cit. (ft. 16), p.255.
20 For more, see: Przetacznik, op. cit. (ft. 16), p. 254. See also: Truyol y Serra, op. cit. (ft. 19), pp. 
50-52.
21 For more, see: Przetacznik, op. cit. (ft. 16), p. 263; Truyol y Serra, op. cit. (ft. 19), pp. 56-57.
22 See: Grotius, H., De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in quibus Jus Naturae & Gentium, item Juris 
Publici praecipua explicantur, Vol. I, Buffalo, New York, William S. Hein & Co. Inc., 1995, p.75.
23 See: Montesquieu, Ch.-L. de S., O duhu zakonâ, Vol. 1, Zagreb, Demetra, 2003, Book X, p. 147.
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Finally, another significant scholar of international law – Emmerich de Vat-
tel – considers the causes of “just war” to be preservation of personal right, self-
defence, but also sanction against the aggressor.24
Recently, the first significant attempts to restrict the use of force at the level 
of positive international law, primarily focused on reprisals with the use of force, 
and then also on the war, on the one hand, are related to the Calvo, i.e. the Drago 
Doctrine the content of which is incorporated in Article 1 of the Second Hague 
(the so-called Porter) Convention of 1907,25 and on the other hand, to the estab-
lishment of the League of Nations in 1919, i.e. to the adoption of its Covenant. 
However, none of these two documents excludes the war as an international legal 
“sanction”, but rather, in a way, merely approves it as such – the Pact considers 
it to be a ultima ratio instrument,26 and the Porter Convention similarly consid-
ers the unilateral use of force to be an ultimate measure for non-acceptance of 
arbitration by a debtor State, or for non-fulfilment of its obligations according to 
the arbitration award.
For the first time, the above-mentioned Paris (the so-called Kellogg-Briand) 
Pact of 1928 explicitly prohibited the war as an instrument of national politics 
(Art. 1), thus denying its centennially recognized significance of emanating na-
tional sovereignty.27 However, this prohibition was not general either. It was 
merely an obligation, and then also a privilege of the State Parties to the Pact, and 
in turn, by this Pact the war remained not only recognized outside the circle of 
its Parties, but it also executed the punitive function, so to speak, for the sake of 
compliance with the Pact’s provisions. The State Party that did not comply with 
the Pact would place itself outside the international legal “subsystem” established 
by this Pact, and then the war against it would be allowed at the level of general 
international law.28
24 For more, see: Vattel, E. de, The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied 
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, London, Robinson, Paternoster-Row, 
1797, Book III, pp. 291-193 and 301-314.
25 For the wording of the Convention, see in: La Pradelle, op. cit. (ft. 4), p. 172.
26 Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides: “The Members of the League 
agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will 
submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and 
they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the 
judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the 
arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the 
Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.“ For the text of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, see in: ibid., pp. 225-233.
27 See: supra, ft. 4; see also Briand’s speech of 27 August 1928 in: Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangères (ed.), Le Pacte général de renonciation à la guerre comme instrument de politique 
nationale, Paris, Imprimerie des Journaux officiels, 1928, pp. 56-59.
28 See: Brück, O., Les sanctions en droit international public, Paris, A. Pedone, 1933, pp. 188-
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The prohibition of war, as well as the prohibition of any unilateral use of 
force other than self-defence, entered into general, currently also peremptory in-
ternational legal norms only after the Second World War, primarily owing to the 
Charter of the United Nations, primarily owing to its above mentioned provision 
of Article 2, Paragraph 4.29 Thereby, the aggressive war, as well as the reprisals 
with the use of force in peace, become inadmissible not only per se, but also, it 
seems, left out from the potential content of the secondary international legal 
norm. However, neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Charter 
did completely abandon the use of force despite the first constraint, and subse-
quently prohibition. On the contrary, indeed, the Pact (subsequently amended by 
the Geneva Protocol of 1924, and Locarno Treaties of 1925),30 and the Charter 
to an even greater extent, merely pursued to funnel such a decentralized power. 
The provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter –Article 41 to begin with, and espe-
cially the provisions of Articles 42 and 43 – are considerably more definitive and 
challenging than the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.31 In 
this respect Fischer singles out five important distinctions: while the admissible 
189. Likewise, it is set out in the preamble of the Pact: “… any signatory Power which shall 
hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits 
furnished by this treaty; (…).” For the text of the Pact, see: supra, ft. 4.
29 See: supra, ft. 3.
30 For the texts of the Agreement,  see in: La Pradelle, op. cit., (ft. 4), pp. 300-329.
31 Article 41 of the Charter sets out: “The Security Council may decide what measures not in-
volving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”
 Article 42 of the Charter sets out: ”Should the Security Council consider that measures pro-
vided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, 
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Furthermore, Article 43 of the Charter 
sets out: 
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of interna-1. 
tional peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call 
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and 
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. 
Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree 2. 
of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be pro-
vided. 
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 3. 
Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or 
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by 
the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
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unilateral use of force in the form of self-defence is in fact an exception in the 
Charter, it is a stipulation in the Covenant; in accordance with the Covenant the 
use of force is left to the Member States of the League, but in compliance with 
the recommendation of the Council, while in accordance with the Charter the en-
forcement action is initiated and governed by the Security Council; in that respect 
the League Council could merely offer a recommendation to Member States, 
while the Security Council makes a decision on such an action, which becomes 
a binding decision for the Organization Members; according to the Charter the 
enforcement action is taken by armed forces of the Organization, while by the 
Covenant it was left to ad hoc established contingent armed forces of Member 
States; finally, the reason for the use of force is set out to a considerably larger ex-
tent in the Charter, while according to the Covenant the enforcement action may 
be taken merely in the event of war inconsistent with the provisions of the Cov-
enant; in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter it may follow in the event of 
any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,” established by 
discretionary  decision of the Security Council.32 In this way, the collective secu-
Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides:
“1 Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 
12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance 
of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals 
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, com-
mercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and 
the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 
2 It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments 
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall sever-
ally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. 
3 The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in 
the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to mini-
mise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mu-
tually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number 
by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage 
through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-oper-
ating to protect the covenants of the League. Any Member of the League which has violated 
any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by 
a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the 
League represented thereon.” For the text of the Covenant, see in: supra, ft. 26.
32 See: Fischer, G., “Article 42”, in: Cot, J.-P., Pellet, A. (ed.), La Charte des Nations Unies – 
Commentaire article par article, Paris, Bruxelles, Economica, Bruylant, 1985, p. 706. Article 
39 of the Charter as a prerequisite for the application of measures referred to in Articles 41 and 
42 provides: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.” For the text of the Charter, see: supra, ft. 3.
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rity provided by Article 11 of the Covenant33 is established much more broadly in 
the Charter. Nevertheless, Article 43, set out as a specific pactum de contrahendo, 
remained “a dead letter”. “The international armed forces” therein provided were 
never established, and the Military Staff Committee they were to be commanded 
by remained without any function. A bold conception of almost complete cen-
tralization of power within the system of the United Nations did not get any fur-
ther than mere aspirations of the founders of the League of Nations.34 The entire 
system of collective security, in the form of a general conception put forward in 
the Charter, remained without any “superstructure” owing to a lack of political 
willingness of Member States to put it into practice. Not only did the centraliza-
tion of power fail, points out Franck, but also the presumptions of its application 
were not legally specified.35 Thus, not only the qualification in a specific event 
(which would be in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter), but also the legal 
determination of the concepts “threat to the peace”, “breach of the peace” and 
“act of aggression” was subject to ad hoc interpretation of the Security Council 
as a political, and not a legal organ. Moreover, the so-called “fact finding” mecha-
nism also failed to take its hold, and consequently, it is a small wonder that in the 
event of an armed conflict all parties most frequently refer to self-defence. The 
result of this condition in the doctrine, but also in practice, was utter disagreement 
in terms of the “party authorized” for the use of force as provided by the Charter. 
The opinions ranged from completely stipulated use of force through the action 
of “armed forces of the United Nations” referred to in Article 42,36 through views 
33 Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides: “…Any war or threat of war, 
whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared 
a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be 
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.“ For the text of the Covenant, see 
in: supra, ft. 26. 
34 For some ideas concerning the establishment of a permanent international armed force within 
the League of Nations, see e.g.: Royal Institute for International Affairs, International Sanc-
tions, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 122-123; Frowein, J. 
A., “Article 43”, in: Simma, B. (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, 
München, C. H. Beck, 1994, p. 637. When the League of Nations was established, Hadjiscos 
wrote: “…[I]l peut être nécessaire de faire appel aux sanctions militaries. Celles-ci ne seraient 
pas conçues, dans l’ordre international nouveau, comme un acte de guerre et retour à un passé 
aboli, mais comme un acte de force accompli au service du droit par la collectivité des na-
tions.” Hadjiscos, D. N., Les Sanctions Internationales de la Société des Nations, Vol. 1, Paris, 
Maracel Giard, 1920, p. 101. It should be mentioned, however, that in 1992, in “An Agenda 
for Peace”, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghalli recommended that the Security Council 
initiates negotiations in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. See: An Agenda for Peace, 
A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 43.
35 See: Franck, Th. M., “Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of 
Force by States”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 5, 1970, p. 811.
36 See e.g.: Castañeda, J., “Valeur juridique des resolutions des Nations Unies”, Recueil des cours 
de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, Vol. 129, 1970, pp. 265-268.
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regarding Article 42 independent of Article 43,37 (confirmed in the practice of 
peace-keeping operations) to argumentation contributing to subsidiary authorisa-
tion of Member States, and their regional agencies to take the use of force into 
their own hands, owing to a lack of centralized power provided by the Charter.38 
During the “Cold War” (which began shortly after the establishment of the United 
Nations) the balance of opposing super powers, largely paralyzing the applica-
tion of Chapter VII of the Charter, concealed hazardous defects of this concept 
of centralization of power within the Organization, which, for that matter, mostly 
resulted from such a state of affairs. After the War the issue of the use of force 
within the system of the United Nations and in turn also at the level of general 
international law, lapsed into general insecurity, whether in terms of stipulation of 
admissibility and authorization to its use, or in terms of its purpose, and general 
legal nature and form.
The appearance of the above mentioned phrase “war against terrorism” in the 
sense of a requirement to legalize the unilateral use of force outside the frame-
work of positive international law, but also broadening of the concept of self-
defence, and the use of force at all – starting with an attempt to broaden the 
content, as well as temporal constraints of self-defence (primarily through efforts 
to legalize preventive, anticipatory self-defence) to bringing quasi-legal institutes 
such as “humanitarian intervention” or “pro-democratic intervention” at the door 
of international legal system – have brought this system today to the brim of an-
archy, trying to “restore” the use of force to the level of primary norm – that is, 
to establish it as a subjective “right” of the one who may in fact use it, which is 
always the “stronger” against the “weaker”.
III. “WAR AGAINST TERRORISM” AND CONTEMPORARY  
INTERNATIONAL LAW
On 14 January 2006 many world media broadcast the news about the tragic 
US air strike on a village of Damadola in north-west Pakistan. The strike was 
37 See e.g.: Seyersted, F., “United Nations Forces, Some Legal Problems”, British Year Book 
of International Law, Vol. XXXVII, 1961, pp. 359-362 and 438-439; Higgins, R., Problems 
and Process – International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 266. 
Kelsen’s conclusion, however, is also interesting: “Article 42 refers to ‘air, sea, or land forces’ 
without providing that these forces must be armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security 
Council by the Members.” Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations, London, Stevens & 
Sons Limited, 1950, p. 756.
38 Some of these views are mentioned in the article by Lobel and Ratner; see: Lobel, J., Ratner, 
M., “Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires 
and the Iraqi Inspection Regime”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1, 
1999, p. 130; see also: Detter, I., The International Legal Order, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singa-
pore, Sydney, Dartmouth, 1994, p. 547.
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targeting to murder (!) Ayman al-Zawahiri – one of the leading Al-Qaeda men. 
The strike did not bring the expected result, but in the event 18 people, Pakistani 
nationals – including women and children – lost their lives. Naturally, Pakistani 
authorities protested of course, but the US responses were mostly reduced to a 
mere explanation that the strike was targeting the terrorists, and not against Paki-
stan on any account.39
Does contemporary international law, based on the provision contained in 
the above mentioned Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
leave any space for such “separability”?
The current norms of international law (especially under protection of the 
United Nations), undisputedly incriminate terrorism implicating, moreover, im-
mediate international legal responsibility of terrorist organizations, but concur-
rently imposing upon states the obligation to fight against terrorism and the ob-
ligation to deny any support, and especially safe haven to terrorists.40 “The war 
against terrorism”, as some indicate, also challenges the classical state-centric 
conception of international law (and in turn the concept of war), turning it into a 
trans-national concept. In any case, the Security Council points out in its Resolu-
tion 1456(2003) of 20 January 2003: “[I]t has become easier, in an increasingly 
globalized world, for terrorists to exploit sophisticated technology, communica-
tions and resources for their criminal objectives (…)” Hence, it may be con-
cluded that nowadays a strictly “interstate” concept of “ius ad bellum” does not 
correspond to modified circumstances in the international community in which 
non-state actors play an increasingly more important role. New “wars” include 
trans-national networks that comprise of non-state entities, but sometimes also the 
states that support them (actively or passively). After all, terrorist organizations 
(unlike e.g. pirates) operate on or at least from a territory of a state, which may, 
on the other hand, support their activities financially, logistically, etc., or simply 
tolerate them passively, but sometimes may also have no power to prevent them. 
Therefore, “the war against terrorism” in the sense of the use of force by other 
states (or even an international organization) unfailingly affects the national terri-
tory of a state the terrorists are located in. The attempts of legal argumentations of 
39 For more, see e.g.: “U.S. air strike targeting Ayman al-Zawahiri leaves 18 dead in Pakistani 
village”; http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/18_killed_in_U.S._air_strike_on_village_in_ Pakistan 
(19March 2006). See also: “Pakistan protests airstrike”; http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/
meast/01/14/alqaeda.strike/ (20 March 2006).
40 Thus, e.g. Resolution of the Security Council 1624 (2005) binds all countries, besides full 
cooperation in fight against terrorism, also to deny safe haven to any person involved in terror-
ism: “(…) [A]ll States must cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in accordance with 
their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice 
(…) any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financ-
ing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts…”
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such strikes (like the afore-mentioned American strike in Pakistan, or American 
strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan following terrorist attacks on the American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and leading up to the American mili-
tary occupation of Afghanistan in 2001) may basically assume two directions: the 
direction of indictment of the related state for the so-called “indirect aggression” 
interpreted in the sense of providing support and safe haven to terrorists (the so-
called harbouring of terrorists), or in the direction of “emancipation” with the 
country of parallel or even exclusive direct international legal responsibility of 
terrorist organizations themselves.
However, both argumentations, in an effort to remain within the frameworks 
of positive international law, primarily aim to activate the provision of Article 51 
of the UN Charter which declares the inherent right of a state to individual or col-
lective self-defence. However, the mentioned provision recognizes self-defence 
if an “armed attack occurs”,41 which brings us back again to anyhow insuffi-
ciently explicated concept of the act of aggression in international law.
Namely, the argumentation that is exclusively based on international respon-
sibility of a state from whose territory a terrorist organization operates or which 
provides it with a safe haven, considers the relational state as an aggressor, or 
more precisely, as a perpetrator of the so-called “indirect aggression” provided, 
admittedly, by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314(XXIX) 
of 14 December 1974 on the definition of aggression. The mentioned Resolu-
tion, namely, Article 3(g) also considers aggression to be: “The sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry 
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above [acts of aggression, the author’s remark], or its substantial in-
volvement therein.“42 Although in that respect some authors consider such acts 
as a direct aggression even when committed by non-state actors such as terror-
41 Article 51 of the Charter provides: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” For the text of the United Nations Charter, see: supra, ft. 3.
42 However, it should be put forward that the mentioned Resolution A/3314(XXIX) after having 
defined aggression by general definition and enumerated particular acts that constitute ag-
gression (Article 1 and Article 3), in Article 4 sets out:  “The acts enumerated above are not 
exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under 
the provisions of the Charter.“ For the text of the Resolution in Croatian, see: Lapaš, D., Šošić, 
T. M. (ed.), Međunarodno javno pravo – izbor dokumenata, Zagreb, Pravni fakultet u Zagrebu, 
2005, pp. 60-62.
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ist organizations, at the same time they are unwilling to recognize the status of 
a hostile party to members of such an organization, or the war prisoner, for that 
matter.43 On the other hand, attributing related acts to a state even in the sense of 
“indirect aggression” indicates essential credibility gaps in this respect. First of 
all, if a terrorist attack is “indirect aggression” of a state from whose territory they 
operate, how can it then be explained that the attack on terrorists, like the one in 
Pakistan, was “separable”, i.e. the war against terrorists, and not concurrently the 
war against the relational state? Furthermore, if we follow the standpoint of the 
International Court of Justice in the well-known dispute between Nicaragua and 
the United States of America in 1986, the acts of such paramilitary, and likewise 
non-state entities may be attributed to a state merely under an assumption of its 
effective control of them,44 which in terms of terrorist organizations and their 
international networks need not be the case at all. However, even if the circum-
stance of effective control should exist as an assumption of attributing terrorist 
acts to a state with a qualification of its “indirect aggression”, then it should defi-
nitely not be subject to final evaluation of a “stronger” state in the role of index 
in causa sua, but to objective investigation (e.g. since it also implies the use of 
force, the investigation should be conducted by the UN Security Council at least), 
in which – as a general principle of law – the evidential burden would lie upon 
the accusing state.45 At any rate, in the event of self-defence the mentioned provi-
sion in Article 51 of the Charter gives the authority (even if it is post factum) to 
the Security Council precisely. Similarly, if we continue to reason in the same 
direction, the mere tolerance towards the presence of terrorists on the territory of 
a state, and its denied extradition could even less find any place in the definition 
of aggression, even in its “indirect” form.
On the other hand, the argumentation that goes in the direction of immediate, 
isolated international legal responsibility of terrorist organizations for aggression 
also has its deficiencies. Thus, for instance, the existence of a subjective element 
– an intention to wage war (animus belligerendi) in terrorist attacks in general 
does not seem convincing, which was used traditionally in international law to 
make a distinction between a war and other similar forms of the use of force 
43 E.g. Brown, D., “Use of Force Against Terrorism After September 11th: State Responsibility, 
Self-Defence and Other Responses”, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Vol. 11, No. 1, 2003, p. 24.
44 See: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 64-65, para. 115.
45 On the contrary, following the American strike on Afghanistan in 2001, the American UN 
Ambassador merely notified that the United States are aware of the Taliban responsibility for 
the terrorist acts on September 11; see: Mégret, F., “War? Legal Semantics and the Move to 
Violence”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, p. 381.
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(for instance, currently prohibited forced reprisals).46 Likewise, the intensity is 
also dubious. In order to constitute aggression the terrorist attack should, in ac-
cordance with the mentioned definition of aggression, be an armed act of such 
gravity that it could amount to other forms of aggression committed by a state, 
i.e. its regular armed forces. Since terrorist acts are mostly of a smaller scale and 
isolated, and by no means continuous military operations, it is possible to suspect 
the fulfilment of this criterion. Hence, in the mentioned argumentation the weak-
est point of such utterly extensive interpretation of aggression would indisput-
ably be to apply its definition to terrorist organizations as perpetrators of “direct” 
aggression. The authors who advocate this argumentation are supporters of the 
mentioned extended definition of aggression, and then, in turn also of extending 
the institution of self-defence in international law to the acts of such non-state 
entities.47
On the contrary, however, many authors are still inclined to a more traditional 
interpretation of aggression and, in turn, of self-defence. Thus, as pointed out by 
Pellet and Tzankov, since the Fall of the Berlin Wall terrorism has started to be 
qualified by the United Nations as a threat to international peace and security in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter (which, in theory, also facilitates po-
tential application of collective measures of the Organization, including those in-
volving the use of armed force). Some states (such as, for instance, Libya, Sudan 
or Afghanistan) have even been affected by the UN sanctions, indicted of their 
reference to terrorism.48 Nevertheless, terrorist acts have never been declared 
aggression by the United Nations! Since self-defence is connected with aggres-
sion by Article 51 of the Charter, as above demonstrated, the mentioned authors 
draw a conclusion that reference to self-defence in the context of terrorist attacks 
is unfounded.49 The United Nations, it seems, are not inclined to such a wide-
ranging extension of the definition of aggression. However, Resolution of the 
46 See e.g. Andrassy, J., Međunarodno pravo, Zagreb, Školska knjiga, 1990, p. 555 and 565. 
On the contrary, an act of terrorism is characterized by an intention to create a state of fear in 
the general public (animus terrendi, so to speak). In that sense, the UN General Assembly in 
its Resolution A/55/158 of 30 January 2001 specifies terrorism as “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes (…)” Terrorism is similarly specified by Guillaume: “[L]e ter-
rorisme implique l’usage de la violence dans des conditions de nature à porter atteinte à la vie 
des personnes ou à leur intégrité physique dans le cadre d’une enterprise ayant pour but de 
provoquer la terreur en vue de parvenir à certains fins.” Guillaume, G., “Terrorisme et droit 
international”, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, Vol. 215, 
1989, p. 306.
47 See e.g. Brown, op. cit. (ft. 43), pp. 19-32.
48 For more details, see: Lapaš, D., Sankcija u međunarodnom pravu, Zagreb, Pravni fakultet u 
Zagrebu, 2004, pp. 219-220, 225-228.
49 See: Pellet, Tzankov, op. cit. (ft. 2), p. 71.
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Security Council 1368(2001) of 12 September 2001 does seem a bit confusing, 
which, declaring the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington (a day before) 
a threat to international peace and security, already in the next paragraph refers to 
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter”. The Security Council, probably under the impact of the United States, 
and certainly under the impression of a completely unexpected disaster a day 
earlier – as we are more inclined to believe – merely clumsily “slightly opened” 
the door of the unilateral use of force as a response to a terrorist act, rather than 
made any more resolute progress at the level of secondary international legal 
norm, which it may have truly desired in the first place. Pellet and Tzankov would 
possibly agree with this, indicating that the subsequent, and probably the most 
important Resolution of the Security Council in the context of the “war against 
terrorism” Resolution 1373(2001) does not aim to authorize any state for the uni-
lateral use of force in the fight against terrorism, that is to say without any prior 
special authorization by the UN Security Council,50 although admittedly, in its 
preamble it reaffirms “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.” Needless to say, an objection 
may be raised in this respect, as well.  Namely, the right of self-defence, if we fol-
low the wording of the Charter of the United Nations, is an inherent right merely 
proclaimed by its Article 51. Why would then the reference to self-defence de-
pend on the prior authorization of the Security Council (or any other international 
body for that matter)? On the contrary, the right of self-defence (if recognized 
in this context) would become active “automatically” by the act of a (terrorist) 
attack, while duration of self-defence would be determined alternatively: by de-
terrence of attack (aggression), or taking of collective measures of the Security 
Council for “the maintenance of international peace and security” – which is 
provided by Article 51 of the Charter anyway.
Nonetheless, we are prone to accept the traditional standpoint against all 
odds, but starting from the concept of aggression and not from self-defence as 
its effect. Aggression is an act of war by which the state of war usually begins. 
Besides the mentioned subjective element, adopted by customary international 
law – animus belligerendi – the war is also a state,51 which implies specific dura-
tion and continuity of war operations. Terrorist acts, regardless of their intensity, 
and level of organization, are sporadic acts of violence. Their intention, therefore, 
is not to wage war (animus belligerendi), but to create a state of fear in the gen-
eral public (a specific animus terrendi, as it may be called) “in exchange for” the 
achievement of specific, mostly political aims, which renders them significantly 
50  Ibid., p. 70.
51  See: Andrassy, op. cit. (ft. 46), p. 564.
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distinct from aggression as an act of war. The so-called “war against terrorism” 
thus, in our opinion, despite the gravity of the issue it is fought against, does not 
deserve to be qualified as “war” (or “armed conflict”, as designated by a contem-
porary euphemism) in international legal sense of the word.52 By its secondary 
norms, international law also takes a stand against terrorism, raising its perpetra-
tors, even as non-state entities, to the level of immediate addressees of relational 
norms. For instance, however, just like any life taking does not constitute a mur-
der in criminal law, so in international law any use of force (whether by a state 
or a non-state entity against it) does not necessarily constitute war. Therefore, 
seeking international legal justification for the use of force against terrorist orga-
nizations among some other secondary norms of international law seems to be far 
more convincing than clumsy and arbitrary interpretations of classical interna-
tional legal institutes like aggression, or self-defence for that matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, what conclusion may be drawn about the so-called “war against ter-
rorism” as a requirement for admissible unilateral use of force by a state, against 
terrorists on the territory of another state? Is it indeed a new “bellum iustum” 
brought to the “threshold” of international legal system by modern times? In or-
der to search for an answer, we should, first of all, wonder about the nature of this 
equity which, outside secondary norms of positive international law, turns war 
into a “just” war. However, even if we made an effort to believe in such equity as 
“praeter legem”, that is supplementary to positive law, it would be difficult not 
to notice its inconsistence with the mentioned provision of Article 2, paragraph 
4 of the Charter of the United Nations53 – one of the rare peremptory norms 
of contemporary international legal system. Likewise, the mentioned “equity”, 
therefore, is not merely praeter (supplementary to law), but contra legem, and 
thus its contradiction.
In the system of the United Nations the unilateral use of force is admissible 
only as individual or collective self-defence, i.e. as a response to aggression – 
and, as we have seen, the terrorist act is not aggression. The activation of the 
52 Naturally, if the “war against terrorism” should assume characteristics of armed conflict be-
tween states such as, for instance, in the case of the American strike on Afghanistan in 2001 
and its military occupation, then it becomes a classical war in which deposition of allegedly 
pro-terrorist authority turns out to be a completely irrelevant motive for the existence of the 
state of war, as well as for compulsory application of the regulations of  the law of armed con-
flicts, and particularly humanitarian law. 
53 See: supra, ft. 3.
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mentioned mechanism as set out by Chapter VII of the Charter,54 and also collec-
tive measures of the Organization within its framework, seems to be at the level 
of secondary norms of the UN law, in fact the only form of admissible use of 
force in the fight against terrorism and terrorist organizations on the territory of 
another state, but as a response to the threat to peace as established by the Secu-
rity Council in terms of the provision of Article 39 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and not as a response to “the act of aggression”. Such measures should 
then, naturally, be aimed against terrorists exclusively, and utilized as assistance 
to the state from whose territory the terrorists operate.55 In fact the recognition 
of direct international legal responsibility of terrorist organizations concurrently 
also opens up the possibility of the afore-mentioned “separability,”56 but merely 
in the context of a collective response of the international community admis-
sible by international law, and not as a “private war,” which merely remains an 
arbitrary unilateral use of force based on the “right of the stronger”. Any other 
attempt to justify the unilateral use of force by a state (with or without “allies”), 
except perhaps hardly conceivable reference to the institute of “the state of ne-
cessity” at this point,57 undisputedly remains outside the framework of positive 
54 See: supra, ft. 31.
55 It is important to put forward that the implementation of the mentioned measures, the ap-
plication of regulations of the law of armed conflicts, and particularly humanitarian law is 
not disputable on any account. Moreover, this UN obligation is especially pointed out by the 
Secretary-General, see: Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian 
law, Secretary-General Bulletin, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999.
56 See: supra, after ft. 39. However, if a state declines to take measures against terrorists on its 
territory on its own, or on the other hand, despite a lack of power to resist them on its own, 
declines the UN action, it will inevitably also “activate” its own parallel co-responsibility, if 
not as an “indirect” aggressor (in the absence of effective control of terrorists on its own terri-
tory), then as a co-instigator of the threat to international peace – thus, the same circumstances 
stipulated by Article 39 of the Charter for the application of the just mentioned measures of the 
Organization, whether with or without the use of force.
57 In some legal dictionaries the “state of necessity” is specified as “an excuse for committing 
what would otherwise be a criminal offence if the act or omission which is in question was 
necessary to prevent the execution of an illegal purpose.” Rutherford, L., Bone, Sh. (ed.), 
Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, p. 226. Some authors 
see the potential unilateral use of force in the “state of necessity” resulting from a threaten-
ing terrorist act; see e.g. Müllerson, R., “Jus ad bellum and International Terrorism”, Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 32, 2002, p. 33. However, the mentioned institute requires an 
utterly restrictive approach at all times, not only owing to an immanent unlawfulness of such 
an activity, but also owing to the fact that the relational institute, just like all forms of self-help, 
is always accessible only to the stronger, i.e. to the one who in fact can independently protect 
its right. Thus, the UN International Law Commission, although in its Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts “necessity” may not be invoked by a State 
unless it is “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril; (…)” (Art. 25); the use of force, however, is omitted from this context; see: A/
CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 26 July 2001.
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international law, condemned to seek its “justification” in some other metajuridic 
or even eschatological equity, i.e. mostly in vague spheres which those whose 
conduct cannot be supported by legal norms resort to. After all, contradicting 
legal regulation of the use of force to one’s own conception of equity contra le-
gem, would imply proving antinomy of the legal with the moral or the religious 
system. In such a conflict the legal system in general does not fare well, but 
any legal system, including the international legal system, knowingly strives to 
absorb this metajuridic equity into its norms. In this respect by regulation of the 
use of force international law does not only protect the “weaker” from autocracy 
of the “stronger”, but also separates the use of force from violence, and conse-
quently a regulated international community from anarchy. It is, therefore, hard 
to believe that moral or religious normative systems would aspire to the contrary. 
Thus, reference to God from the beginning of this paper may rather be replaced 
by a paraphrase of the biblical proverb: “To do (…) law is more acceptable to the 
Lord than sacrifice.”58 
(Translated by Hrvoja Heffer)
Sažetak
“Rat protiv terorizma” – novi bellum iustum
Rad se bavi problemom dopustivosti jednostrane upotrebe sile uobličene u 
suvremenoj sintagmi „rata protiv terorizma“, posebice kada je takva sila upere-
na protiv terorističke organizacije koja djeluje na području druge države. Kako 
suvremeno međunarodno pravo, počevši od Povelje Ujedinjenih naroda svojim, 
čak kogentnim normama zabranjuje jednostranu upotrebu sile protivnu teritori-
jalnoj cjelovitosti i političkoj nezavisnosti druge države, zagovornici dopustivosti 
takvog „rata protiv terorizma“ pokušavaju naći uporište u konceptu „pravednog 
rata“ (bellum iustum).
Rad, stoga donosi pregled razvoja tzv. „doktrine pravednog rata“, počevši od 
antičkih pisaca, skolastike, pa sve do novovjekovnih shvaćanja, prateći istodobno 
i tendencije ka ograničenju jednostrane upotrebe sile na razini pozitivnoga me-
đunarodnog prava.
S druge pak strane, međunarodno pravo svojim se ne samo primarnim, već i 
sekundarnim normama suprotstavlja terorizmu, izdižući njegove počinitelje, čak 
i kao nedržavne entitete, na razinu neposrednih adresata odnosnih normi. Time, 
međunarodno pravo omogućuje borbu protiv terorizma primjenom čak i mjera 
s upotrebom sile predviđenih glavom VII. Povelje, no kao odgovor na prijetnju 
58 The Holly Bible, Prov. 21:3, (ft. 12), p. 626.
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miru, ili eventualno čak i tzv. „indirektnu agresiju“ države koja ostvaruje efektiv-
ni nadzor nad nekom terorističkom organizacijom, no takva ocjena, kao ni upo-
treba sile nipošto ne mogu biti prepušteni „pravu jačega“, već naprotiv, moraju 
svoje mjesto naći u spomenutim sekundarnim normama međunarodnoga prava, 
posebice prava Ujedinjenih naroda. 
Pritom, posezanje za pravičnošću, ovdje, kao ni inače, međunarodnom pravu 
nije strano,  no zagovornici oživljavanja koncepta „pravednog rata“ zaboravljaju 
da pravičnost može biti tek nadopuna pravu, a ne njegova negacija.
Ključne riječi: „rat protiv terorizma“, pravdan rat (bellum iustum), terorizam, 
terorističke organizacije, Ujedinjeni narodi, uporaba sile
